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WHY INVESTIGATE CREATIVITY?
To make a better world, correcting mis-
takes is not enough. We need positive
ambition that motivates us to go on.
Creativity (i.e., the process of generating
something new and useful), which offers
the most exciting models of life, is such
a source of motivation. Without thinking
about fame or prestige, creativity makes
people want to change something in the
world. Through research on pathologi-
cal cases psychologists have discovered a
great deal about the thinking and feel-
ing of healthy people. But not much has
been learnt about those at the other end of
the scale, namely those significantly above
average in a positive sense. If people want
to find out what is missing in their life,
they should consider finding out more
about those people who possess what they
are missing, that is who are creative and
happy.
HOW TO INVESTIGATE CREATIVITY
Psychologists began to investigate creativ-
ity in the 1950s, and had many problems
finding a widely accepted definition of it.
They began to construct paper-and-pencil
tests to measure the creative potential of
people. Some of the characteristics more
commonly found were tolerance of ambi-
guity, openness to experience, flow, auton-
omy, verbal fluency, metaphoric thinking,
persistence and intrinsic motivation, as
well as complexity, which is defined as
a confluence of conflicting attributes in
the same person (e.g., extraversion and
introversion) and the flexibility to switch
back and forth among these attributes,
as the situation requires (Haller and
Courvoisier, 2010).
Most of the studies found that the most
important characteristic of creative indi-
viduals is “an almost esthetic ability to rec-
ognize a good problem in their domain”
(Sawyer, 2006, p. 47). What these results
suggest is that the creative personality is
somehow related to a specific domain.
Individuals possess different possible fea-
tures, but the confluence of certain char-
acteristics may be more valuable in one
domain than in another (e.g., a musi-
cian may need to be more extraverted
than a visual artist). Conventions in dif-
ferent domains (e.g., art vs. science) most
obviously are not the same, and a person
might choose a domain that fits his or her
predispositions.
When Amabile (Amabile, 1982; Hill
and Amabile, 1993) analyzed the first
wave of tests, which measured the orig-
inality of individuals (e.g., Torrance Test
of Creative Thinking; Torrance, 1998),
she also noticed that there was always a
subjective, implicit assessment built into
those tests. Originality was not captured
objectively, but through the validation
of raters, who had their own subjec-
tive criteria. Amabile concluded that:
“A product is creative when experts
in the domain agree it is creative”
(p. 1001).
This gave rise to one of the most
frequently reported techniques for assess-
ing the creativity of a product in a spe-
cific domain, that is, independent expert
evaluation of a work as more or less
creative. However, these efforts seemed
to suffer from subjectivity. How can we
know who is appropriate as an expert?
Some researchers (Haller et al., 2010, 2011)
found that the rating of the products
changed according to the creator’s charac-
teristics (e.g., intelligence), and the back-
ground of the rater (e.g., expert vs. novice
raters).
Cognitive psychologists were con-
cerned with creative mental processes.
They wanted to explain the phenomenon
of creativity by pointing out that it devel-
ops from normal, daily mental processes,
from cognitive abilities everyone pos-
sesses. The result is widespread knowledge
about, and acceptance of the 5 stages
of the creative process: (1) prepara-
tion, (2) incubation- or maturation, (3)
illumination- or enlightenment, (4) eval-
uation, and (5) elaboration (Cropley and
Cropley, 2010). These stages can differ in
depth and breadth among subjects, cul-
tures, and domains, and they can also
repeat and overlap with variable inten-
sity (Shaw, 1989). This process seems to
underlie creation independently of the
domain a person or group has to adjust to.
The investigation of brain function
across time may call for scientific tools
such as the electroencephalogram (EEG),
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which is a non-invasive measure of elec-
trical brain activity. Electric field poten-
tials are recorded that represent changes
of potential differences between differ-
ent areas that arise from either excitatory
and/or inhibitory postsynaptic potentials.
Whereas the P300 (300ms after stimu-
lus) measures cognitive processing speed
and attentional resource allocation, N200
(200ms after stimulus) measures cogni-
tive response inhibition (Patel and Azzam,
2005). To measure P300, and/or N200,
specific tasks have to be created, which
the participant has to solve. A reaction
to very specific auditory or visual stimuli
however, has so far been an unsatisfactory
method of investigation, and has mostly
been used for insight studies (i.e., measur-
ing the third stage of the creative process).
After all, we cannot just have someone
walk around with an EEG cap on, and
measure the stages of the creative process
in real time. Since short-time brain reac-
tions are not suitable to detect changes in
cortical activity, which presumably (as in
the case of creativity) occur in long time
windows, EEG may need to be comple-
mented by other scientific methods.
A far more promising approach that
involves EEG experiments is the compar-
ison of artists and non-artists on a task
closer to real-life (e.g., composing music,
visualizing an abstract concept). The ques-
tion arises however, whether these experi-
ments simply prove domain specificity or
actually capture creativity per se. It does
not seem too unexpected that a musi-
cian shows different brain activity patterns
from those of a non-musician when think-
ing about music. The question remains
whether a scientist shows the same brain
activity when thinking about science as
the musician does when thinking about
music.
Neuroimaging studies measuring func-
tional aspects of brain activity—fMRI,
PET, or NIRS—rely heavily on tests that
measure remote associations or diver-
gent thinking (i.e., variant thinking; e.g.,
TTCT). The origin of the former lies in the
development of the Remote Association
Test (RAT) on the basis of the idea that
individuals have an associative hierarchy,
which leads to more or less creative solu-
tions (i.e., flatter associative hierarchies
= more creative solutions) (Mednick,
1962). However, the resulting test asks
for a single correct association implying
cognitive processes similar to those from
a wide range of other analytic and con-
vergent thinking tests (Lee et al., 2014).
Creativity may not be comparable to a
stage of problem-solving, since individu-
als may work in domains where problems
have not yet been specified. Thus, their
success is dependent on the formulation
of a new problem (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996;
Runco, 2014).
Other association tests do not ask for
a single solution, but for original associa-
tions with a specific word or letter. While
verbal and/or semantic fluency measures
do not ask for a certain solution, most of
them are timed (Benedek and Neubauer,
2013). Thus, small changes—such as the
time for completing the test—lead to
higher or lower “creativity” scores within
the same person (Barron and Harrington,
1981).While processing speed is an impor-
tant component of intelligence it may be
less important in the construct creativity.
In fact, it may be one possible explana-
tion of the U-shaped relationship between
intelligence and creativity (i.e., threshold
hypothesis). In other words while pro-
cessing speed may show a linear relation-
ship with intelligence, it may show only a
partial correlation with creativity.
For any such task we think of work-
ing memory and executive attention, thus
some kind of activation (or more prob-
ably deactivation) of prefrontal regions
(Chávez-Eakle et al., 2007; Fink et al.,
2010). The question remains which pre-
frontal cortices are involved. Some studies
point to specific areas (e.g., supplemen-
tary motor area, frontal gyrus [BA9],
right premotor region [BA6], right ventro-
medial prefrontal cortex [BA11], frontal
pole [BA10], left anterior cingulate cor-
tex [ACC], left dorsolateral prefrontal area
[BA46]), while others present diffuse pre-
frontal activation patterns. This inconsis-
tency is to be expected, since even though
the divergent thinking and association
tasks used are made as simple as possi-
ble, they still engage more than one pro-
cess. Thus, apart from the fact that neither
divergent thinking nor associative thinking
or convergent thinking by itself is syn-
onymous with creativity, the process of
creativity may change slightly according to
the domain being investigated and the task
at hand.
Similar to EEG, functional resonance
imaging naturally restricts the possibilities
of testing a real-life scenario. We are cur-
rently unable to create tasks that call for
the complexity and thus time a reality-
close creative endeavor would demand.
Even an imagined real-life process (i.e.,
composition) will cause its problems.
Similarly to the situation with EEG, we
either look at individual differences, and
thus prove or disprove domain specificity,
or we target one specific brain area, using
one specific task (e.g., verbal fluency as a
proxy for divergent thinking, which is sup-
posed to be a proxy for creativity), thus,
proving nothing other than that brain area
differs functionally among people on a
specific task such as verbal fluency. Thus,
brain imaging may very reliably measure
the wrong thing.
The finding that general functions (e.g.,
WM) have been found to be involved in
creativity tasks; and that the activation
of brain areas that support such general
function (but not creativity in particular)
have been found to be activated in cre-
ativity tasks; underlines the problem of
operationalization. It seems that creativity
researchers agree more or less on the the-
oretical framework of creativity, although
they fail when trying to develop a task that
captures the holy in its Holiness. One pos-
sible solution may be to omit the term
creativity altogether. Instead of wanting to
find a single measure that captures creativ-
ity, researchers may try to discuss possible
relationships between different functions
(e.g., verbal fluency, brain functions and
the amount to which these functions are
exhibited) and their respective relations
that may lead a person to create something
new in a specific area of expertise.
THE HOLY GRAIL OF CREATIVITY
Research on creativity has blossomed over
the past 60 years, and investigations in
different areas of psychology, as well as his-
tory, anthropology, sociology, and research
in neuroscience have made remarkable
progress over the past few decades. The
question remains, however, which brain
circuits do we look at in order to investigate
the creative process. We know that the seat
of cognitive flexibility lies in the frontal
lobe, and both hypofunction and gray
matter loss in fronto-temporal and pari-
etal regions are linked to neurocognitive
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impairments. It seems reasonable to
suggest that greater functioning in fron-
toparietal and temporal regions, including
the cingulate cortex (left anterior, BA 32),
hippocampus and amygdala, dorsolat-
eral regions (Brodmann areas [BA] 8, 9,
and 47), lingual gyrus, temporal pole and
orbitofrontal regions are related to cre-
ativity. The question remains, how these
structures are related, what role person-
ality plays, what the difference across
people and domains is, and how they
differ across cultures and historically.
We recently commenced large-scale data
collection online (http://creativity.wjh.
harvard.edu) in an attempt to address this
issue.
Rather than asking if a neuroscience
of creativity is needed, we need to ask
how it can be achieved and integrated into
a combined approach. Rather than look-
ing for one special ingredient, the magic
pill we can take that makes us creative;
we may want to ask what confluence of
factors leads us to become creative in a
specific domain. There is no magic pill,
no Holy Grail, no one brain area, no one
personality, or one way to solve a prob-
lem. Creativity is a lot of work, emotionally
involving, requires motivation, commit-
ment, persistence, curiosity, love of learn-
ing, authenticity, and honesty, working
memory, executive, prefrontal and limbic
system function. The confluence of some
of these different ingredients may change
according to the domain involved (e.g.,
a contemporary dancer may use more of
his or her limbic system, whereas a neu-
roscientist may need more of his or her
executive function), whereas some factors
may be more universal (e.g., complexity,
cognitive flexibility). It seems to be quite
clear that neither research area by itself
will solve the puzzle, nor will any sin-
gle brain function explain the results. We
need to stop looking for the single Holy
Grail and to start looking for the multiple
ingredients that creativity is comprised of.
Creativity—like water—changes its form
as needed, and continuously, patiently,
and passionately finds its way through the
rocks.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Profound thanks to Arthur Cropley for his
comments on the final manuscript and his
constant mentorship.
REFERENCES
Amabile, T. M. (1982). Social psychology of creativ-
ity: a consensual assessment technique. J. Pers.
Soc. Psychol. 43, 997–1013. doi: 10.1037/0022-
3514.43.5.997
Barron, F., and Harrington, D. M. (1981).
Creativity, intelligence, and personal-
ity. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 32, 439–476. doi:
10.1146/annurev.ps.32.020181.002255
Benedek, M., and Neubauer, A. C. (2013). Revisiting
Mednick’s model on creativity−related differences
in associative hierarchies. Evidence for a common
path to uncommon thought. J. Creat. Behav. 47,
273–289. doi: 10.1002/jocb.35
Chávez-Eakle, R. A., Graff-Guerrero, A., García-
Reyna, J.-C., Vaugier, V., and Cruz-Fuentes,
C. (2007). Cerebral blood flow associated
with creative performance: a compara-
tive study. Neuroimage 38, 519–528. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2007.07.059
Cropley, D., and Cropley, A. (2010). Functional
Creativity. Camb. Handb. Creat. 301–318. doi:
10.1017/CBO9780511763205.019
Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1996). Creativity: Flow and the
Psychology of Discovery and Invention, 1st Edn.New
York, NY: HarperCollinsPublishers.
Fink, A., Grabner, R. H., Gebauer, D., Reishofer,
G., Koschutnig, K., and Ebner, F. (2010).
Enhancing creativity by means of cogni-
tive stimulation: evidence from an fMRI
study. Neuroimage 52, 1687–1695. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.05.072
Haller, C. S., and Courvoisier, D. S. (2010). Personality
and thinking style in different creative domains.
Psychol. Aesthetics Creat. Arts 4, 149–160. doi:
10.1037/a0017084
Haller, C. S., Courvoisier, D. S., and Cropley, D. H.
(2010). Correlates of creativity among visual art
students. Int. J. Creat. Probl. Solving 20, 53–71.
Haller, C. S., Courvoisier, D. S., and Cropley, D. H.
(2011). Perhaps there is accounting for taste: eval-
uating the creativity of products. Creat. Res. J. 23,
99–109. doi: 10.1080/10400419.2011.571182
Hill, K. G., and Amabile, T. M. (1993). “A Social
Psychological Perspective on Creativity: Intrinsic
Motivation and Creativity in the Classroom and
Workplace,” in Understanding and Recognizing
Creativity, eds S. G. Isaksen, M. C. Murdoch, R.
L. Firestien, and D. J. Treffinger (Norwood, NJ:
Ablex), 400–432.
Lee, C. S., Huggins, A. C., and Therriault, D. J. (2014).
A measure of creativity or intelligence? Examining
internal and external structure validity evidence of
the remote associates test. Psychol. Aesthet. Crea.
doi: 10.1037/a0036773
Mednick, S. (1962). The associative basis of the
creative process. Psychol. Rev. 69, 220. doi:
10.1037/h0048850
Patel, S. H., and Azzam, P. N. (2005). Characterization
of N200 and P300: selected studies of the event-
related potential. Int. J. Med. Sci. 2, 147. doi:
10.7150/ijms.2.147
Runco, M. A. (2014). Creativity: Theories and Themes:
Research, Development, and Practice. Waltham,
MA: Elsevier.
Sawyer, R. K. (2006). Educating for innova-
tion. Think. Skills Creat. 1, 41–48. doi:
10.1016/j.tsc.2005.08.001
Shaw, M. P. (1989). The eureka process: a struc-
ture for the creative experience in science and
engineering. Creat. Res. J. 2, 286–298. doi:
10.1080/10400418909534325
Torrance, E. P. (1998). Torrance Tests of Creative
Thinking: Norms-Technical Manual: Figural
(Streamlined) Forms A & B. Bensenville, IL:
Scholastic Testing Service, Inc.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The author declares
that the research was conducted in the absence of any
commercial or financial relationships that could be
construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Received: 12 August 2014; accepted: 08 October 2014;
published online: 31 October 2014.
Citation: Haller CS (2014) Neuroscience needs creativ-
ity: the implications of reliable instruments that fail to
measure a loosely defined latent variable. Front. Hum.
Neurosci. 8:869. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00869
This article was submitted to the journal Frontiers in
Human Neuroscience.
Copyright © 2014 Haller. This is an open-access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or
reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the
original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the
original publication in this journal is cited, in accor-
dance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribu-
tion or reproduction is permitted which does not comply
with these terms.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org October 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 869 | 3
